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COMMITTEE DECISION OF CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
AND THE JUDICIAL TEST OF "BEST INTERESTS"*
IN the preceding article Dr. Laurence Kubie has suggested that current
modes of child custody disposition followiNng divorce or separation are in-
flexible and fail to meet the psychological needs of children. In order to remedy
these defects he has suggested that upon separation or divorce, parents agree
to joint legal custody of their children and concurrently choose a committee
to resolve disputes arising out of their possible inability to decide questions
concerning their children's welfare. In this agreement parents would promise
to send to this committee any dispute upon which they had reached an im-
passe, and to be bound by its decision, even if only one of them had acquiesced
to the submission. And they would choose as members of the committee per-
sons such as psychiatrists, educators and clergymen,' presumably equipped to
deal with questions of a child's well-being.
Committee settlement of custody disputes may have significant advantages
when compared with judicial resolution. One of its more obvious merits is
the probable saving to courts of time, money, and resources, and the similar
savings gained by parents. More important might be the committee's putative
greater competency to discover the child's "best interests" - the goal the law
articulates and searches for in custody proceedings.2 This alleged competency
might stem from the specialized training, vocation, and experience of the com-
mittee members, from the lack of institutional pressure to reach rapid de-
cisions,3 and from the possible personal knowledge and proximity of the com-
mittee members both to the parents and the child.4 Other likely merits of the
committee are the less tangible, but crucial, emotional benefits to the child.
Thus, to the extent that the committee's existence may induce the parents to
*-This is a student Note assessing the legal effects of the proposal set out in the
preceding article by Lawrence S. Kubie.
1. The American Arbitration Association is now equipped to arbitrate marital dis-
putes between two persons living under a separation agreement. The panel of arbitrators
contains lawyers, clergymen and other professionals in the field of social service. The
parties may have provided for arbitration, in the agreement or may decide to arbitrate
particular disputes. This procedure, however, is much more formal than the one Dr. Kubie
contemplates, and the arbitrators must be selected from a panel submitted to the parties
by the Association. American Arbitration Association, Marital Disputes Arbitration
(Memorandum, Nov., 1963).
2. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 138, Bastian v. Bastian, 81 Ohio L. Abs. 408, 13 Ohio
Op. 2d 267, 160 N.E.2d 133 (Ct. App. 1959); Shuffman v. Shuffman, 10 App. Div. 2d
936, 200 N.Y.S.2d 949 (1960); Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Custody, 10 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 721, 728 (1944); LINDEY, SEPARATION AGREEIENTS AND ANTE-NuP-
TIAL CONTRACTS §§ 14-33 - 14-35 (2d ed. 1961).
3. It seems reasonable to assume that conscientious committees handling few disputes
will be able to spend more time deliberating over their determinations than do many judges
who are burdened with heavy case loads.
4. Dr. Kubie suggests that the committee be composed of persons acquainted with
the parents. Kubie, Provisions for the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New
Legal Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197, 1200 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kubie with page
number]. Some of the members, then, will probably know the child. The committee might
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reach agreement on their own,5 the child will be spared the possible psycho-
logical disturbance of a third party decision concerning his future. And even
when the parents cannot reach an agreement, committee settlement, to the
extent that its informal procedures stimulate a spirit of compromise and con-
ciliation not engendered by the typical adversary proceeding, may prevent not
only detriment to the child which may result from public adjudication of his
future, but also emotional upheaval which potentially flows from any acrimo-
nious dispute in which he is involved. A final probable value of the proposed
committee system is a consistency of decision and attitude toward the child
which may not be guaranteed by the vagaries of court proceedings. 6
There are, however, possible disadvantages to the proposal. Joint custody
itself may be attacked on grounds that it perpetuates a relationship which
has been unsuccessful and thus may create more acrimony than single cus-
tody, or that it lacks the finality of disposition which may be desirable for
the child's feelings of security. The committee mechanism may be vulnerable
because the relative ease of access to it as compared to a court - e.g., the
informality, privacy and lack of expense - may remove the psychological and
economic reluctance of parents to initiate third party proceedings, 7 one of the
major incentives to parental agreement regarding custody problems. In addi-
tion, resort to the committee may have emotional effects upon the child more
adverse than those caused by judicial proceedings. It might be more disturb-
ing, for example, for the child to be examined by a number of committee
members than by a single judge in chambers. Even the putative expertise of
the committee members may not render them more competent to decide in-
dividual disputes than an experienced domestic relations judge. Finally, al-
though the committee may be able to gather empirical evidence and provide
explicit advice concerning "best interests," the legal doctrine of "best inter-
ests" may be asking for more than the mere opinions of experts. It may de-
thus be in. a better position than is a judge to render a decision that best fits the particular
circumstances of the child and his parents.
On the other hand, that the committee members are friends of the parents may prove
troublesome. The committee, for example, may be so concerned with not hurting either
parent that it may render a compromise solution, when the child's best interests require
that one of the parent's proposals be adopted in toto. Or, by the time the committee, chosen
at the time of the agreement, is called upon to decide a dispute, some of the members may
be more friendly with one parent than, the other, leading to bias or, possibly, "leaning over
backwards," either of which could be detrimental to the child's best interests. Kubie pro-
vides for changing committee members, id. at 1198-99, but parents, not contemplating the
immediate use of the committee, may be reluctant to invoke this procedure for personal
reasons such as the fear of alienating someone who supposedly is a friend.
5. Dr. Kubie feels that the committee will have this effect. Id. at 1200. Lindey agrees.
LINDEY, op. cit. .supra note 2, at 29-30.
6. Each time the parents want a judicial determination of a custody problem, the
proceeding may be held before a different judge. Even when the same judge is involved,
his vast case load may cause him to treat the child as "just another case" rather than as
an individual with particular problems. A committee, however - especially one whose
members are in constant contact with the parents - is better able to fit the immediate
issue into the context of the child's past history and particular circumstances.
7. Contra, see note 5 supra.
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mand a community consensus, expressed through the courts, as to the values
which the community desires to maximize in child custody dispositions.
Whether the advantages of Dr. Kubie's proposal outweigh the disadvantages
may be a question of individual preference or a subject for further psycho-
logical study: but an inquiry into the threshold question of how courts can
or ought to react to situations arising out of a committee agreement appears
important and fruitful - for both the lawyer advising his client and the court
faced with a committee agreement. If a parent, for example, requests a court
either to stay the committee proceedings or to preempt the committee by
deciding a current dispute and the other parent simultaneously requests that
the judicial proceedings be stayed," must the court, even if it believes that the
committee is not the best means for determining the child's "best interests,"
enforce the original agreement and permit the committee to act? Or are there
principles of family law or arbitration law which would allow the judge to
override the agreement? If the court is not bound to allow the committee to
act, does family law or arbitration law prohibit the judge from sending a dis-
pute to the committee, even when he favors committee settlement? Analogous
questions arise when a parent refuses to abide by a committee decision and
the other seeks judicial enforcement. Must (or may) 'the court enforce this
determination as it enforces commercial arbitration awards? 9 Or must (or
may) it undertake substantive review? And upon review, what weight should
be given to the committee's decision? Finally, will the answers to these ques-
tions differ, depending upon whether the committee provision is embodied in
a bare separation agreement or is one incorporated into a judicial decree?1o
In investigating the legal effect and enforceability of committee action, the
preliminary issue is whether or not the committee is properly classified as an
"arbitration" panel subject to the doctrines of arbitration law. It might be
argued that because one parent may submit a dispute to the committee without
the consent of the other, its powers are different from those of an arbitration
panel. But this distinction seems artificial since the committee satisfies the
fundamental definition of an arbitrator - "A private, disinterested person,
chosen by the parties to a disputed question for the purpose of hearing their
8. As will be shown subsequently, see note 11 infra and- accompanying text, the com-
mittee must be treated as an arbitrating agency. Thus one is likely to use arbitration
procedure when faced with problems concerning the committee.
See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 102; N.Y. Civ. PRACT. LAW & RULES § 7503;
UNIFORm ARBITRATION AcT § 2 and 6A CoRDIN, CONTRACTS § 1443, at 432 (1962).
9. Normally, a court does not review the substance of an arbitration award and will
only vacate in extreme cases such as where fraud or corruption. was present or the arbi-
trator exceeded his power. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PPAcr. LAW & RULES § 7510 (1963);
CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 12862 (1961). But courts will sometimes vacate an, award on the
merits because it is against public policy. See note 55 infra and accompanying text.
10. Where the parties seek a divorce or separate maintenance decree, they may sub-
mit their separation agreement to the court to be incorporated into and made a part of such
decree. If a merger takes place, "the contract as such loses its efficacy and the force be-
hind a judgment takes its place." Buasy, LAW REFRESHER: DOmESTIC RELATIONS 63
(1960). Where the parties separate without obtaining a judicial decree or do not have the
agreement incorporated into the decree, the agreement is treated as an ordinary contract.
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contention and giving judgment between them .... ,,1 Most states have arbitra-
tion statutes which provide that, "[M]ost ... agreements to arbitrate future
disputes are lawful and valid.' 1 2 In these states, courts should refuse to hear a
complaining parent and should permit and enforce the agreement 13 - whether
or not it is incorporated into a divorce or separate maintenance decree - un-
less family law objections render the arbitration against public policy.'- In a
few states, however, an agreement to arbitrate future disputes may always be
revoked by either party.15 In such states, if Kubie's provision appeared in a
bare separation agreement, one not incorporated into a divorce or separate
maintenance decree, a judge could not send a dispute to the committee if
either parent objected. However, it might be possible to avoid this common
law rule where the agreement has been incorporated into a court order by
arguing that because the committee provision was part of a court established
procedure for settlement of disputes concerning the child rather than a mere
agreement between the parties, neither party could unilaterally restrain its
operation.' 6
Where arbitration law seems to require performance of the committee agree-
ment, it must be determined whether the immense power of the courts in
custody proceedings, derived from the court's conception of itself as parens
patriae 17 to the children involved, would prevent or affect the enforceability
of the agreement. Custody agreements are not ipso facto void, but no agree-
ment between parents can deprive a court of its jurisdiction over children.18
If the court feels that the agreement is in the best interests of the child, it may
incorporate the agreement into a divorce or separate maintenance decree.
19
11. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 135 (4th ed. 1951). In Erlich, Inc. v. Unit Frame &
Floor Corp., 5 N.Y.2d 275, 279 (1959), the court said, "arbitration is but a substitute for
the judicial process, with the parties creating their own forum and picking their own
judges."
12. 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1443, at 431 (1962). See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRACT. LAW
& RULES § 7501; CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 1281.
13. 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1443, at 432 (1962).
14. See notes 36-42 infra and accompanying text.
15. In most common law jurisdictions an agreement to arbitrate all future disputes
that might thereafter arise was unenforceable. 6A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1443 (1962).
While this result has been changed by statute in most states, see note 4 supra, a few
states do not have such statutes, leaving the common law rule applicable. See, e.g., Bough-
ton v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1960).
16. Once a separation agreement is incorporated into a court decree it becomes part
of the court order and is treated as a judgment of the court having the usual attributes
of a judgment. 17 Am. JuR. Divorce and Separation, § 822 (1957) ; BURBY, op. cit. supra
note 12, at 63. But courts always retain the power to modify custody decrees. See Bron-
son, Custody on Appeal, 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 737, 738 (1944).
17. See, e.g., LINDEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 14-30; Matter of Bull, 266 App. Div.
290, sub noin. In re Hellman, 42 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1943), aff'd, 291 N.Y. 792, 53 N.E.2d
368 (1944) ; Matter of Hill, 199 Misc. 1035, sub norn. Hill v. Hill, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755
(Sup. Ct. 1951).
18. See LINDEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at §§ 14-2, 14-29 and authorities cited therein.
19. Weinman, supra note 2, at 731; 17A Am. JUR. Divorce and Separation, § 822
(1957).
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But, if it believes that the agreement does not work to the advantage of the
child, it can invalidate the custody provisions and impose new custodial terms,
without disturbing the remainder of the agreement.20 Moreover, a court order
with respect to either the major elements or the incidents of custody2' is never
final, but is usually considered subject to modification if the "best interests"
of the child so require, notwithstanding the fact that the decree incorporated
an agreement between the parents.22 A custody agreement not incorporated
into a court order also may be modified by a court.23 The broad power of the
court is further evidenced by the fact that in many states the court retains
jurisdiction to decide custodial matters* even if a divorce or separation is
denied, under the theory that, once acquiring jurisdiction, the court can grant
full relief.2 4 And in some states statutes permit either parent to bring an action
for the exclusive control of the children, even though no divorce is applied
for, with the decree subject, of course, to modification.2 5 Furthermore, courts
often ignore the procedural incidents of trial, refusing to allow technical con-
siderations to impede their determinations of the child's best interests.2 6 Final-
20. LINDEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 14-2.
21. For the purposes of this Note, the various aspects of custody have been divided
into two rough categories; the "major elements," consisting of matters such as with whom
the child shall live and visitation rights, and "incidents," consisting of matters like vaca-
tions, schooling and medical treatment. This distinction is suggested by LINDEY, op. cit.
supra note 2 at § 14-5.
22. See LINDEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 14-30; Weinman, supra note 2, at 731 and
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 1444 and authorities collected therein. Cases in which custody orders
have been modified are legion. See, e.g., Bastian v. Bastia; 81 Ohio L. Abs. 408, 13 Ohio
Op.2d 267, 160 N.E2d 133 (Ct. App. 1959) (with whom the child should live); Bernstein
v. Bernstein, 80 Cal. App. 2d 921, 183 P.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1947) (visitation rights);
Frizzell v. Frizzell, 158 Cal. App. 2d 652, 323 P2d 188 (Ct. App. 1958) (schooling).
This result may be provided for by statute, as well as being part of the court's inherent
power as parens patriae. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE § 138.
23. Sullins v. Sullins, 280 P.2d 1009 (Okla. 1955).
24. Bronson, Custody on Appeal, 10 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 737, 738 (1944).
25. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 199, 214.
26. See, e.g., Stokowski v. Lumet, 17 Misc. 2d 735, 191 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct.
1959), in which the court ruled that even though the petitioner, seeking modification of
the custody order, had procedurally failed to establish a basis for court action, the issue
of the health and welfare of children was before the court and must be determined, as,
"The proceedings are not technical; the welfare of the children does not depend upon the
whim of the parents, nor should it depend on the skill of counsel in trying the issues."
Id. at 737, 191 N.Y.S.2d at 619. The court added that once a court acquires jurisdiction
in a custody proceeding, the parties cannot withdraw without the court's approval and
the petition will only be dismissed upon the merits. There is no question of burden of
proof and the court on its own motion can seek expert opinion.
While there are jurisdictional problems in the law of custody, see generally Note,
Ford v. Ford: Full Faith and Credit to Child Custody Decrees?, 73 YALE LJ. 134
(1963), that the divorce decree was granted in a foreign state will not usually prevent a
court so disposed from modifying the decree if the child involved is a resident of the
state. See, e.g., Stout v. Pate, 120 Cal. App. 2d 699, 261 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1953);
Matter of Bull, 266 App. Div. 290, sub nom. In re Hellman, 42 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1943), aff'd,
291 N.Y. 792, 53 N.E.2d 368 (1944).
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ly, the court possesses broad discretion, which is difficult to upset on appeal.21
This discretion is necessitated by the individuality of each child, the subjective
nature of the "best interests" doctrine 28 and the consequent need for a de-
cision-maker who has the parties before him. An appellate court thus finds it
extremely difficult to say that there was no evidence upon which a reasonable
judge could have based his decision. To limit the scope of the trial court's
discretion, appellate courts have developed the rule of "changed circum-
stances,"2 9 which holds that a custody order may not be modified unless cir-
cumstances have so changed since the grant of the original decree that the
child's best interests warrant modification, or there is a showing that the facts
warranting modification were unknown to the party urging them at the time
of the prior order and could not with due diligence 'have been ascertained.A0
But trial courts can almost always find changed circumstances - the age of the
child, for example,"' if nothing else - and, in fact, are seldom reversed on
this ground. 2
In light of its broad and equitable 33 power over custody, a court faced with
a committee provision in a separation agreement, whether or not the agree-
ment is incorporated into a court order, would not be compelled to send a dis-
pute to the committee or to accept the committee's decision; under principles
of family law the court would still retain the power to modify or reject the
27. See, e.g., 17A Am. Jua. Divorce and Separation, § 817 (1957); DiGiorgio v.
DiGiorgio, 87 Cal. App. 2d 576, 197 P.2d 213 (Ct. App. 1948) ; IHorsley v. Horsley, 77
Cal. App. 2d 442, 175 P.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1946).
28. See generally Note, 73 YALE L.J. 151 (1963).
29. Curbing judicial discretion is not the only reason for the rule. It is also a means
of curbing senseless litigation by preventing dissatisfied parties from keeping the courts
continuously occupied with petty grievances and with hearing evidence of events occur-
ring prior to the issuance of the custody decree. Peterson v. Peterson, 64 Cal. App. 2d
631, 149 P.2d 206 (1944).
30. Gantner-v. Gantner, 39 Cal. 2d 272, 246 P.2d 923 (1952).
31. Bernstein v. Bernstein, 80 Cal. App. 2d 921, 183 P.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1947).
32. But cf., e.g., Bachman v. Mejias, 1 App. Div. 2d 319, 151 N.Y.S.2d 48 (1956),
where the New York court reversed in the mother's favor a lower court modification of
a Puerto Rican custody order, saying the evidence was insufficient to warrant a finding
of a "change of circumstances." This type- of ruling is rare, however, and the court was
influenced here by the fact that by coming to New York the mother had flaunted a Puerto
Rican court order directing her to bring the child to Puerto Rico for disposition as the
Puerto Rican court saw fit. See also Johnson v. Johnson, 72 Cal. App. 2d 721, 165 P.2d
552 (1946).
The use of the rule as a curb on judicial discretion has been further eroded by state-
ments that it is not ironclad and that a court might be justified in modifying a custody
order even if there has been. no "change in circumstances." See, e.g., Bernstein v. Bern-
stein, mspra note 31; Peterson v. Peterson 64 Cal. App. 2d 631, 149 P.2d 206 (1944).
The rule, in fact, allows broad judicial discretion in the opposite sense in that, if the
court wants to uphold the original order, by finding no change in circumstances it can
refuse-to hear evidence of the parties' conduct prior to the issuance of the order. Gantner
v. Gantner, 39 Cal. 2d 272, 246 P.2d 923 (1952), and Sutera v. Sutera, 1 App. Div. 2d
356, 150 N.Y.S.2d 448 (1956).
33. See Bronson, supra note 24, at 738.
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committee provision if it found that the best interests of the child so re-
quired.3 4 However, a court which decides that the committee mechanism for
solving disputes arising out of a joint custody is generally desirable - and
desirable in the case before it 35 - may want -to enforce the agreement unless
precluded from doing so by the doctrine that agreements to arbitrate which
are against public policy will not be enforced. 0 It might be contended that
the agreement violates public policy in that its enforcement would involve the
court's abandonment of its custody-regulating function in favor of a third party.
The precise question of whether a committee plan frustrates public policy in
this manner has yet to come before a court; but in New York two cases have
presented a virtually identical issue.37 In Hill v. Hill 38 the court, faced with
an arbitration provision in a separation agreement, denied a motion to compel
arbitration of a dispute involving visitation rights and the child's home, hold-
ing that such matters "are not properly the subject of arbitration."2 9 This
ruling was followed in Michelman v. Michelvian,40 where the court denied
a motion to compel arbitration of a controversy involving visitation rights,
saying that since arbitrators need not "follow the law,"4' the courts have in
certain situations involving public policy set aside awards in conflict with such
policy and have refused to direct arbitration in such situations. The court
declared that "the well-being of this child as it will or may be affected by
visitation rights can only be determined on a hearing. '42 The implicit ra-
tionale of both these broadly phrased opinions, which seem to go beyond the
specific fact situations to lay down a general rule of law, appears to be that
arbitration of child custody disputes is against public policy because only a
34. See notes 18-23 mpra and accompanying text.
35. It is possible that a judge could approve generally of the committee as a device
for solving custody disputes, yet feel that in the case before him the child's best interests
would be best served by a judicial determination. For example, he might not approve of
the particular committee members, he might feel that he is better equipped to handle
a particular problem than the committee, or the case might be one in which time is of
the essence and for some reason the court could act more quickly than the committee.
36. See, e.g., Domke, Arbitration, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 633, 637 (1955) ; Wilco v. Swan,
346 U.S. 427 (1953); Knickerbocker Agency v. Holz, 4 App. Div. 2d 71, 162 N.Y.S.2d
822, aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 245, 173 N.Y.S.2d 602 (1957); Kabinoff v. Kabinoff, 19 Misc. 2d
15, 163 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
37. No such cases in other jurisdictions have been discovered.
38. 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
39. Id. at 1038, 104 N.Y.S.2d at 758. This was quoted from a dictum in Waltman v.
Waltman, 103 N.Y.L.J. 221 (Jan. 15, 1940), the first case in which the question of the
arbitrability of a custody dispute arose, where the court said,
It may not, however be amiss for the court to express its opinion that such mat-
ters as the custody of a child and the right of visitation are not properly the sub-
ject of arbitration, depending for their determination upon a judicial finding as to
the best interests of the child.
Id. at 221.
40. 5 Misc. 2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
41. Id. at 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d at 608. Here the court seems to have meant that the
arbitrator would not necessarily have ruled in the child's best interests but might rather
have given weight to other considerations.
42. Michelman v. Michelman, 5 Misc. 2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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court can determine a child's best interests. If the reasoning of these cases is
followed, when the court is faced with the question of whether it should send
the dispute to the committee or undertake an immediate determination itself,
the court will surely choose the latter alternative.
However, a judge desirous of permitting a custody dispute to be decided
by the committee or of enforcing a committee judgment might employ three
limited arguments for distinguishing Hill and Michelinan in specific fact
situations. 43 The first would be that Hill and Michelman do not apply because
they were concerned with a standard arbitration clause rather than a commit-
tee arrangement such as Kubie suggests. The courts there were faced with the
spectre of a third party agency composed of a single man-a man whose identity
and ability might not have been known to them - whereas the court presented
with the possibility of committee resolution can investigate the competence of
the members, and can rely on a presumption that three men in concert are
more likely to arrive at a correct decision than is a single person. 44 But to the
extent that the committee is a third party mechanism for the settlement of a
dispute, it is functionally equivalent to an arbitrator, and in light of the
rationale of Hill and Michelman,45 it is doubtful that courts would find the
difference in labels a meaningful distinction. A second possible argument
would point out that Hill and Michelman were concerned with major elements
of custody: visitation rights and the child's home. Where only an incident of
custody such as vacations or schooling is involved, it might be contended that
the state is less concerned with making the decision, 46 thus distinguishing
these cases. This was done in Friedberg v. Friedberg,47 where the court held
that the issue of the selection of the child's school and the payment of tuition
- incidents of custody - could be arbitrated, specifically distinguishing
Michelman on the ground that visitation rights - a major element of custody
- were involved there.48 Thirdly, where a court is confronted with a separa-
tion agreement which has been incorporated into a judicial decree rather than
one that stands alone,49 as appears to be the situation in Hill and Afichehnan,
43. Outside New York, of course, Hill and Michehinan have little value as precedent,
but they are indicative of judicial reasoning on the subject of third party settlement of
custody disputes and they would most likely be cited by counsel opposing the submission
of the dispute to the committee. In New York, being only Supreme Court decisions, no
other court is bound to follow them but they would have some persuasive effect.
44. It might also be thought that the presence of the child's trusted ally (see generally
Kubie) differentiates the committee proceeding from arbitration in that it assures that the
child's, as well as the parents', interests will be represented.
45. This rationale seems to be that only a court and not a third party tribunal can
determine a child's best interests. The Hill and Michelnan courts never mention whether
they know the identity of the arbitrators, probably because any knowledge of the arbitra-
tor's competency would have had no bearing on their decision.
46. LINDEY, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 29-16.
47. 23 Misc. 2d 196, 201 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
48. The Friedberg court was content to leave the distinction as one between visitation
rights and schooling. It never made the generic distinction between major elements and
incidents of custody.
49. See note 10 supra.
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it might be urged that the committee provision is not a "mere arbitration
clause" conflicting with family law policy, but is rather a court order spelling
out custodial rights and procedures and directing that certain controversies
between the parents be settled in a designated manner. The rationale for this
distinction is that the court approving the agreement has already found that
the committee mechanism does not violate public policy and that the court
faced with a dispute arising out of that agreement is merely carrying out the
previous order.50 These last two arguments, however, are rather artificial in
that they rely on verbal distinctions and ignore the main rationale of Hill
and M11ichelnan - that a third party tribunal is not a proper means for dis-
covering a child's best interests in a custody dispute. This rationale is not
mitigated by the importance of the subject matter or by the fact that a court has
previously passed on the agreement. In addition, these means of distinguish-
ing Hill and Michelnan would not be available in a case where the major
elements of custody were involved and the separation agreement stood alone.
Because of the difficulty in distinguishing Hill and Michelman, it seems only
proper that a court which is asked to decide a dispute itself, yet is convinced
of the committee's value and desirous of submitting to it the particular issue,
should face the problem squarely by refusing to follow those cases. That there
seems to be no reason to fear arbitration in a family law setting has been
recognized in a line of New York decisions where the support and maintenance
of a mother and her children have been held arbitrable.51 In Robinson v.
Robinson 52 the lower court stated:
Fixing the amount which a husband shall pay for the support of his wife
and children is something which our courts are doing practically every
day, and the discouragement of litigation over that subject is so plainly in
the public interest that I would have supposed that no question could be
raised as to the right of the parties to agree upon another tribunal to do
the same thing.53
To the extent that support payments affect a child's welfare as much as cus-
tody, no distinction between these cases and the custody disputes is tenable.
There is no point, for example, in deciding if a child should go to a private
50. By accepting this argument, however, the court would be merely deceiving itself,
for if arbitration of custodial disputes is ipso facto contrary to public policy, no prior
determination could render it in keeping with that policy. Furthermore, when the parents
have mutually agreed to a separation agreement and the divorce or separation is granted,
the agreement is often added to the decree in toto without so much as a glance from the
judge.
51. See, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 296 N.Y. 778, 71 N.E.2d 214 (1947); Lasek v.
Lasek, 13 App. Div. 2d 242, 215 N.Y.S2d 983 (1961) ; Dowell v. Berger, 127 N.Y.L.J.
2274 (June 6, 1952). In Robinson and Lasek the separation agreements appear to have
been standing alone, while in Dowell the agreement was incorporated into a divorce
decree. The courts did not distinguish between the situations but this would have been
unnecessary since arbitration was upheld in all three cases.
52. 186 Misc. 974 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
53. Id. at 976. This decision was reversed by the Appellate Division, 271 App. Div.
98 (1946), but was subsequently affirmed without written opinion by the Court of Appeals,
296 N.Y. 778, 71 N.E.2d 214 (1947), and the inference may be drawn that the Court of
Appeals approved of the quoted language.
1964] 1209
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
school, if a previous arbitration panel has awarded him fifty dollars per month
support.
The basic reason, however, for not fearing arbitration and for refusing
to follow Hill and Michelnan is that enforcement of the committee agree-
ment would be unlikely to result in a decision contrary to the child's best in-
terests. This conclusion can be reached -by treating the committee device in
either of two ways. A bold judge, convinced that a Kubie-type committee is as
likely as a court to arrive at decisions in the best interests of a child, could
use this determination to say that there is no public policy against committee
determination of child custody disputes; under arbitration law he would
then send the dispute to the committee.54 If the committee's decision were
later challenged by the losing party, the judge - per se objections to the
committee having been disposed of in the earlier hearing - would continue
to apply arbitration law, upsetting the committee's determination only if it
were contrary to public policy.55 This would mean that the court would review
the decision only if the allegations of the complaining party were sufficient, if
proven, to hold that the decision had been decidedly contrary to the child's
best interests.58 The burden of non-persuasion would be on the complaining
parent in such a hearing, and a judge desirous of fostering the committee's
device, could "honestly" uphold a committee determination that he himself
might not have reached.5 7 If the committee were viewed in this manner, it
appears unlikely that many parents would even attempt to challenge a com-
mittee decision. But at the same time the court would retain the power to
54. Since the goal of the law in this area is to discover the child's best interests, by
determining that a committee is as qualified as a court to discover a child's best interests,
the judge will also have determined that there is no public policy against sending the
dispute to the committee. See note 2 supra. Thus neither arbitration law, see note 36 supra,
nor family law prevents him from allowing the committee to act.
55. Wainwright v. Globe Indemnity Co., 25 Misc. 2d 212, 210 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup.
Ct. 1960), the court said,
The court will not lend its power to the enforcement of the kind of decision in
arbitration which it would neither allow nor enforce as a subject of an action
maintained before it directly.
Id. at 214, 210 N.Y.S.2d at 189. Thus, it added, awards have been vacated which are
illegal in result or contractual inception, which otherwise violate public policy as in mat-
ters of infant custody, which are illegally erroneous on their face and which are punitive
and excessive in damages. See also Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper Union, 280 App. Div.
500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952) ; Franklin v. Nat. C. Goldstone Agency, 23 Cal. 2d 628,
204 P.2d 37 (1949) ; and Comment, Jvdicial Review of Arbitration: The Role of Public
Policy, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 545 (1963). See note 9 supra.
56. In Michelman the court pointed out that a court could refuse to enforce an arbi-
tration award that was against public policy, but failed to realize that this doctrine miti-
gated the non-judicial nature of the determination of the child's best interests.
57. Because of the highly subjective nature of the "best interests" test and the in-
herent lack of certainty that any given decision is better than many of its alternatives, a
judge could easily find that, although the committee's decision was not the one he would
have made de novo, he cannot be certain that his choice is more likely to serve the child's
best interests than is the committee's. Only where he can be certain of this is the com-
mittee's decision contrary to public policy.
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reverse the committee whenever its decisions were demonstrably not in the
child's best interests."8 It must be realized, however, that this method of ad-
judication is not only contrary to the rationale of Hill and Michelman,5 9 but
might also be partially at variance with the idea that in custody proceedings
a court will always grant a full hearing and will not abrogate any of its de-
cision-making function, even in favor of a court-appointed social worker or
psychiatrist. 0 The approach would thus be open to attack upon appeal, and
would probably be upheld only if the appellate court could be convinced that
committees approved by courts were as competent as judges to decide custody
questions.
There is, however, a path more in line with current doctrine which the
favorably disposed court might follow to render the committee a feasible al-
ternative for settling custody disputes. First, as in the previous approach, the
58. One possible difficulty with this approach is that the committee might render a
decision which is contrary to the child's best interests, but which the court would never
get a chance to review because both parents were satisfied. But, if the court were to allow
the child, either himself or through a third party, possibly his "trusted adult ally,"
Kubie at 1199, to protest a committee decision, this would further insure that his best
interests would not be jeopardized by the committee plan. Whether the court would grant
the child standing to object to the committee's decision is problematical. Normally, a
child does not have party status in a custody proceeding, see generally Goldstein & Katz,
Materials on Family Law 482-514 (1963) (unpublished materials on file in Yale Law
Library), although the court may seek his views. Furthermore, neither the child nor a
third party may normally move to modify a custody decree or a separation agreement.
Except under a "neglected child" statute, see, e.g., ILL. AiN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2006 (Supp.
1964), parties other than one's parents usually have no right to bring the court questions
affecting the child. One of the reasons for the child's lack of party status, however, is
the reluctance of the state to interfere with the parents' iight to control their children;
the state usually will only step in when it is asked; e.g., a motion to modify a custody
decree. But, where the parents have ceded part of their control over their children to a
third party, a committee, the state might feel that it now can interfere, if necessary, even
if the parents are satisfied, to assure itself that the child's best interests are being served.
One way for the state to do this would be for it to allow either the child or a third party
to protest a committee decision. In addition, the "trusted adult ally" presents a convenient
means for such disputes to be presented to the court, something that is lacking in the nor-
inal custody situation.
59. The courts in Hill and Michehnan, it must be remembered, felt that a third party
tribunal could not be entrusted with any part of the decision-making process.
60. "The trial court cannot delegate to anyone the power to decide questions of child
custody." Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 629, 651 (1954). Thus in Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431,
144 P.2d 592 (1943), the court quoted from Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d
581, 122 P.2d 96, saying,
The power of decision vested in the trial court [in custody cases] is to be exer-
cised by a duly constituted judge, and that power may not be delegated to investi-
gators or other subordinate officials or attaches of the court, or anyone else.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Id. at 436, 144 P2d at 595. See generally Annot., 35 A.L.1.2d 629 and, authorities cited
therein.
It must not be forgotten, however, that here the judge has not entirely given up his
ultimate power of decision since he can still overturn the committee determination, if
necessary.
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court must make the determination that it is not against public policy - i.e.,
not against the child's best interests - for the committee to initially decide
the dispute. But in refusing to decide immediately and permitting the commit-
tee to act, the court need not cede any of its power to the committee. By com-
bining the arbitration law doctrine that courts may set aside arbitration awards
in conflict with public policy 61 with the court's power to review any custody
order when circumstances have changed, 62 the court could grant a de novo
hearing in order to determine whether -the decision was in the child's best
interests whenever a committee's decision were challenged. 62 If the judge
merely sent every dispute to the committee, and then, when his jurisdiction
was invoked again, reviewed each conflict de novo, the child's best interests
surely would not suffer from the lack of a proper forum to determine them;
but the length of the process itself might result in such harm that a judge
might be reluctant to send the controversy to the committee in the first place.
Three steps would be necessary to arrive at a final decision - a preliminary
judicial determination to decide whether the dispute should go to the commit-
tee, a committee proceeding to discover what is in the child's best interests
and a judicial review to determine whether the committee solution really is in
his "best interests." Such a three-step process would be likely to prevent the
realization of some of the substantive advantages claimed for the committee :64
It is doubtful whether such an extended process would result in savings of
time, money and resources to either the court or the parents, and it seems
likely that few of the putative psychological advantages would be achieved.
But the judge should look beyond the immediate case and not allow the spectre
of the three-step process to prevent implementation of what he, by hypothesis,
thinks is a beneficial means for advancing a child's best interests. For the
threat of a three-stage procedure in subsequent disputes can be substantially
minimized by strong opinions in the early cases. If judges in the first stage
refuse to stay committee action and refuse to decide the case immediately,
indicating in their opinions that they favor the committee idea generally rather
than just in the specific case before them, later disputants will presumably be
deterred from going into court in an effort to bypass the committee.65 The
court should not fear acting decisively even when allegations of committee
bias are before it, for the court retains the ultimate power to review the com-
mittee's decision.
Given this power of review de novo, however, the judge who wishes to
enhance the committee's effectiveness by discouraging parents fr6m seeking
review of its decisions is still faced with a problem. For, if he finds on re-
view that a disposition different from the committee's would be more in the
61. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
63. See note 58 supra.
64. See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text.
65. This should be especially true since, absent the possibility of committee bias, there
will be little rational reason for a parent to object to the committee before it acts.
1212 [Vol. 73 :1201
CHILD CUSTODY COMMITTEE
child's best interests, he is bound to enter that judgment, and such an occur-
rence would encourage at least a two step process - committee determination
and court review - which would have many of the same disadvantages as a
three step process. But a judge who is well disposed toward the committee is
unlikely to reverse its findings except when they are clearly erroneous. For
although, theoretically, in a de novo hearing the committee opinion should be
treated merely as expert opinion, in practice a judge favorably disposed to the
committee idea is likely to review the committee in much the same fashion as
an appellate court reviews a trial court, giving a strong presumption of cor-
rectness to the committee's determination. Consequently, he is likely to reverse
infrequently. And this in turn is likely to result in parents 66 appealing to the
court only those committee determinations which are demonstrably unfair -
precisely those committee decisions which even the favorably disposed judge
wants to review. Moreover, it is doubtful that parties who originally thought the
committee idea preferable to court settlement of dispute will want to engage in
drawn-out custody battles which they have very little chance of winning; and,
litigation being quite expensive, expense alone may deter parents from invok-
ing the court at any stage of the process. To the extent that the foregoing
analysis accurately depicts the response of potential litigants to broadly writ-
ten opinions in the early cases challenging the committee device, the incidence
of three-step, or even two-step, proceedings is likely to be minimal. Thus, it
is possible for the court, without surrendering any of its prerogatives in cus-
tody matters, to establish the committee device as a feasible mechanism for
solving custody disputes between parents.
66. See note 58 supra.
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